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Safety risk factors in two different types of routine outsourced work: A 
systematic literature review 
 
Outsourcing generates risks for client firms but these vary according to the contracted task. 
This systematic literature review reports on 50 empirical studies that investigate the safety 
risk factors associated with outsourcing aligning them with the three categories of safety risk 
factors identified by Underhill and Quinlan in their PDR-Model. By using a 2x2 framework 
based on the strategic value of the task to the client firm (core or peripheral) and its level of 
complexity (complex or routine) we could combine studies of outsourced relationships 
between firms with those between firms and individuals. This demonstrated that there is little 
empirical evidence available for the safety risk factors associated with complex outsourced 
tasks. It also showed that routine tasks core to the client business contained risk factors 
associated with both economic and reward pressure and disorganization. Finally, safety risk 
factors associated with routine peripheral tasks were mainly due to economic and reward 
pressures in firm-to-individual contracting, but due to disorganization in firm-to-firm 
contracting.  
 







Outsourcing activities to contractors, sub-contractors and temporary workers create additional 
challenges for safety professionals seeking to manage safety effectively (Williams and 
Hebert, 2019). Accident and injury reports attest to these challenges, and high profile cases of 
serious incidents in the UK involving contractors and outsourced activities are common. 
These include for example the explosion and fire at the Buncefield oil depot in December 
2005 where the design and operations procedures were not communicated adequately from 
contractor to client (HSE, 2011), the derailment at Hatfield in October 2000 where Railtrack 
failed to adequately monitor Balfour Beatty’s track maintenance schedule (Office of Rail 
Regulation, 2006), and the exposure of public and staff to asbestos during refurbishment at 
Marks and Spencer stores in 2006 and 2007 where the client imposed constraints on 
contractor operations (BBC News, 2011). In these, and many other cases like them, there is 
often a failure to adequately identify and manage the safety risks inherent in the situation, and 
more particularly the safety risk factors introduced by outsourcing. However, outsourcing is 
not a homogeneous, undifferentiated activity that is universally the same. As a result, the 
safety risk factors also vary, but in ways that currently are ill defined. The purpose of this 
paper is to categorise the safety risk factors identified in existing empirical studies of safety 
management in contracting relationships according to two defining features of an outsourced 
activity, specifically the nature of the task being outsourced and the level at which the 
outsourced relationship occurs. This categorisation reveals how safety risk factors differ 
according to these features thereby providing guidance for safety professionals’ attention. 
The paper takes the following format. It begins with a brief overview of outsourcing 
noting in particular the occurrence of outsourcing across levels, i.e. between firm and firm 
and between firm and individual, and the diversity of the tasks that may be outsourced. The 
PDR model developed by Quinlan and colleagues (Underhill and Quinlan, 2011; Mayhew 
and Quinlan, 1999) and used by others (e.g. Lamm et al., 2017) categorises the safety risk 
factors occurring in activities outsourced between a firm and an individual. Deploying the 
PDR model this paper investigates whether the safety risk factors identified in firm-to-firm 
level outsourcing arrangements are similar or different to those occurring between a firm and 
an individual, and therefore support the extended application of this model. In addition, the 
nature of outsourced tasks vary according to both the strategic value of the task to the client 
organisation and its scale and scope. We derive a conceptual framework that juxtaposes these 
two dimensions and permits legitimate comparison across the two levels noted above. 
Together these allow us to categorise the safety risk factors evident in existing empirical 
studies of outsourced activities. The findings reveal that the PDR model has wider 
applicability; safety risk factors occurring in outsourced activities between firms are similar 
in general to those occurring between firms and individuals, although with different 
emphasis. At both levels safety risk factors associated with economic and reward pressure (P) 
and disorganization (D) are more common than those associated with regulatory failure (R). 
The empirical evidence also focuses on safety risk factors associated with outsourcing routine 
tasks rather than complex ones. The managerial implications of these findings are discussed, 





Outsourcing is defined on a variety of ways (Harland et al., 2005) but these are effectively 
captured in a definition provided by Davis-Blake and Broschak (2009), who define 
outsourcing as “the act of obtaining goods or services from individuals or organizations 
outside of a firm’s boundaries when these goods or services could be created internally by a 
firm’s own employees and managers, pg 322”. They also note that outsourcing may take one 
of three forms depending on the level of analysis and the nature of the task and the working 
relationship between the partners. The first and second of these arrangements respectively 
locate either all or part of a process beyond the firm’s boundary. These arrangements are 
more often firm-to-firm, although firm-to-individual relationships are not excluded. However, 
the third arrangement that they identify involves the procurement of human resources through 
employment agencies. Other forms of contingent work, which may be accommodated in this 
third arrangement, include self-employed individuals who are ‘free-lance’ or independent 
contractors, ‘direct’ hires and seasonal workers (Connolly and Gallagher, 2004). These three 
different arrangements differentiate the outsourcing of processes from the outsourcing of 
staff, emphasizing the need to distinguish between levels of analysis (i.e. between firm-to-
firm and firm-to-individual outsourcing arrangements) in the consideration of outsourcing 
relationships and the associated tasks. 
 
Outsourcing and Safety Risks 
Under the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act (1974), organizations in the UK are legally 
obliged to control safety risks and reduce hazards and so improve safety performance. 
Outsourcing however introduces risks to the organization. While there has been limited 
research on the impact of outsourcing of processes between firms on firm safety performance, 
the outsourcing of staffing (i.e. firm-to-individual outsourcing) is known to adversely affect 
inter-personal relationships. In particular, attitudes, work-group dynamics and supervisor-
subordinate relationships are all negatively impacted by outsourcing (see Clarke, 2003 for a 
review), and each of these are vital contributors to both individual and organizational safety 
performance. 
Quinlan and colleagues have conducted a number of empirical studies investigating 
the impact of outsourcing of staff on the occupational safety and health performance of the 
individuals involved (Mayhew and Quinlan, 1997; 1999; 2006; Mayhew et al., 1997; Quinlan 
et al., 2013; 2015). Through these studies and several comprehensive literature reviews 
(Quinlan et al., 2001; Quinlan and Bohle, 2008) they have developed the ‘Pressures, 
Disorganization and Regulatory Failures’ (PDR) Model that groups factors explaining the 
poorer health and safety performance of individual contract workers into three separate 
categories (Table 1). 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 NEAR HERE 
 
Economic and reward pressures identify risks that contribute to income insecurity 
which encourages unsafe working practices. Insecure jobs encourage workers to accept 
hazardous tasks or work when injured. Irregular payments or payments contingent upon 
5 
 
performance promote corner cutting and risk taking. Long or irregular hours may be 
associated with work intensification and fast-paced work. Economic pressures may also 
encourage multiple job-holding as alone none may be sufficient to provide a living wage. 
This increases the risk of fatigue.  
Disorganization reflects an organizations (lack of) commitment to contractors. 
Individual recruits are often underqualified, under-trained and inexperienced. They 
experience poor induction and minimal training and supervision. Safety policies and 
procedures may be absent or ineffectively implemented, and a transient workforce ensures 
that these are not embedded or sustained.  
Regulatory failure is more likely to be experienced by contractors who either have 
little or no knowledge of their legal entitlements or are compromised by their position in the 
labour market. Enforcement processes are hampered, for example, by identifying those with 
legal responsibility on sites with multiple employers. Gaps in employment protection may 
also appear as the relationship develops. 
While these safety risk factors have been identified from work with individual 
contractors it is likely that they may also apply to outsourcing relationships between firms, 
although this has not yet been documented systematically. Anecdotally, we know that 
economic and reward pressures encourage firms to underbid on contracts or to subsequently 
cut corners to save costs. Stringent contractual arrangements with tight deadlines may 
demand long hours and high tempo work. Communication between firms in an outsourcing 
relationship may not be clear and unambiguous during either the contracting phase or 
subsequently (Oswald, et al., 2018). Similarly, clarity over the procedures and work practices 
to be adopted on site is often lacking. This may be exacerbated by inexperience or lack of 
training. These risk factors contribute to disorganization. When accidents or fatalities occur in 
outsourced activities responsibility is often disputed, suggesting that regulatory failures may 
also occur in outsourced relationships between firms. 
Outsourcing arrangements – conceptual framework for comparison 
There is a considerable literature on contingent and temporary workers and their 
relationship with the lead firms (for reviews see Ashford, George and Blatt, 2007; Connelly 
and Gallagher, 2004; Davis-Blake and Broschak, 2009; Kalleberg, 2000). There is also a 
significant literature on relationships between firms in a supply chain context, although much 
less on inter-firm relationships specifically on outsourcing. In order to legitimately compare 
empirical data across these two levels it is necessary to develop a unifying framework in 
which the constructs at both levels are conceptually equivalent (Whetten et al., 2009). By 
merging two pre-existing models, one from strategic human resource management (Lepak 
and Snell, 1999) and the other from supply chain management (Sanders et al., 2007) into a 
single framework we are able to compare studies conducted at either level. This framework 
juxtaposes the strategic value of the outsourced task to the client firm with the complexity of 
the task (i.e. its scale and scope) and therefore the skill requirements of the contractor.  
In the model of human capital Lepak and Snell (1999) contrast the significance of the 
skills for the firm with the uniqueness of these skills. Skills may be considered to be either 
core or peripheral depending on their contribution to the firm’s strategic requirements. 
Furthermore, skills may be either unique and therefore highly prized, or generic, and less 
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highly valued. The resulting 2x2 framework (Lepak and Snell, 2002) suggests that the firm 
may manage employees in different quadrant differently. In the typology of inter-firm 
outsourcing arrangements developed by Sanders et al. (2007) from interviews with 
experienced executives they contrast two dimensions. The scope of the arrangements 
indicates whether a single task or a whole process has been outsourced, while criticality 
affects the nature of the relationship between the two firms. Tasks of low criticality for the 
lead firm are typically managed through contracts and close performance monitoring, 
whereas tasks that are more critical for the lead firm are less transactional and more 
relationally oriented. 
Often tasks that are critical to the firm have higher strategic value, so that non-critical 
tasks may be described as peripheral to the firm’s business. Tasks, which are core to the 
firm’s business, have higher strategic value. Core critical tasks are contrasted with non-core 
peripheral tasks. The nature of the task normally determines the skills required and the scale 
and scope of the task. A narrow range of skills is usually required for routine tasks of limited 
scope. Conversely, skill requirements increase as the complexity of the task increases. 
Combining these two dimensions provides a 2x2 framework that differentiates different types 
of outsourcing arrangement according to the task that is contracted out (Figure 1). 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 NEAR HERE. 
 
Systematic literature review of outsourcing on safety risks 
Following the method prescribed by Tranfield et al. (2003) for conducting a systematic 
literature review the review question was:  
What are the reported safety risk factors that arise from different outsourcing arrangements? 
Searching for relevant articles began with a review of the content of three literature 
reviews (Quinlan et al., 2001; Quinlan and Bohle, 2008; Milch and Laumann, 2016) (See 
Table 2). Duplicate articles were removed. This initial search was accompanied by a selective 
‘hand search’ to identify further relevant papers (Table 2).  
INSERT TABLE 2 NEAR HERE 
As a complement to these ad hoc approaches conventional database searches were 
conducted subsequently (Table 2). Important constructs for the review question were 
identified. Lists of keywords associated with these constructs were developed and joined in 
search strings with the appropriate Boolean operators (see Table 2). These search strings were 
then used to search two electronic databases (EBSCO and Scopus) known to contain relevant 
academic peer reviewed and scholarly articles on both outsourcing and safety. Table 2 
indicates the number of items identified from either database for each search string. 
Screening titles and abstracts for relevance reduced the number significantly.  
Further screening of the full text from both ad hoc and database searches revealed a 
smaller number of relevant articles (Table 2). To be included in this review papers reported 
an empirical study focused on the safety performance, safety risks and management of safety 
in a relationship between either a client and a contractor, or a principal contractor and a sub-
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contractor, and were published before June 2020. Papers that contained safety aspects of 
contracting relationships in general were excluded (e.g. Nunes, 2012). The remaining articles 
from all sources were then subject to quality appraisal. A large number of articles were 
excluded at this point mainly because of the absence of a clear statement of methods of data 
capture (e.g. Bayer, 2013; Bridger, 2015). Many of these excluded publications captured the 
reflections of experienced practitioners (e.g. Williams and Hebert, 2019).  
Information was then extracted from all of those selected papers that had been 
obtained through either the review of literature reviews or the database search, and were 
deemed relevant and had passed the quality appraisal threshold. This information included 
citation details, location of study, sector, details of the type of outsourced relationship and the 
safety specific risk factors identified in the findings and the discussion of the articles.  
A wide variety of methods are available for the synthesis of qualitative research (see 
Barnett-Page and Thomas (2009) for a review). One of these, Framework Synthesis (Dixon-
Woods, 2011), provides an approach to organizing and analysing large volumes of textual 
data that utilizes an a priori ‘framework’ to extract and synthesize the findings. The rationale 
for the framework for this study has been outlined above, providing a 2x2 matrix based on 
two dimensions: the strategic importance of the task to the client firm and the nature of the 
outsourced task (Figure 1). This could be applied to empirical studies that investigated either 
a firm-to-individual contracting relationship or a firm-to-firm one. 
The nature of the outsourcing arrangement was often inferred from the vocabulary 
used in the text to allow the relationship to be positioned on the 2x2 framework. In many 
cases, it was deemed that the outsourced activity was strategically core to the client firm’s 
business. For example, maintenance and repair of plant are integral to the petrochemical 
industry (Hery et al., 1996; Kochan et al., 1994) and specialist trades such as electricians and 
brick layers are integral to construction (Shrestha et al., 2018). In other cases, notably in the 
studies by Nenonen and colleagues in manufacturing (Nenonen and Vasara, 2013; Nenonen, 
2011; Nenonen et al., 2015) the outsourced activities were deemed peripheral to the client 
firm’s business (e.g. Gomes et al., 2009). With few exceptions, the outsourced tasks were all 
deemed routine rather than complex, because the reported tasks were not so specialised that 
other organizations could not also undertake them. For example, there are often many 
companies that can provide either building skills for construction or vehicles and drivers for 
logistics. In a few cases, the unique context suggested that the tasks were complex (Gochfeld 
and Mohr, 2007; Quinlan et al., 2003) and also core (Garner, 2006). 
Each of the 50 studies identified a wide variety of safety risk factors. They were 
classified using the three main elements of the Pressures, Disorganization and Regulatory 
Failures (PDR-Model; Underhill and Quinlan, 2011). Within each of the three main elements 
of the PDR model there are four subcategories of risk factors (Table 1), which gave a more 
granular analysis of these risk factors. Most of the safety risks (regardless of quadrant) 
identified in the studies in this review relate to either economic and reward pressures (P) or 
disorganization (D) rather than regulatory failure. Consequently, tables 3 and 4 only report 
these two main categories of safety risk factors. 
However not all of the 50 studies could be unequivocally placed in a specific quadrant 
of the 2x2 framework. Some simply indicated tasks that were either core (Gochfeld and 
Mohr, 2007) or peripheral (Gomes et al., 2009) to the client firm’s main business, or routine 
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or complex in the nature of the tasks. Others could not be placed with any certainty because 
they collected data through a survey instrument that was widely distributed (Fabiano, et al., 
2008; Hakansson and Isidorsson, 2016; Sakurai et al., 2013). These seven studies have been 




Fifty empirical studies were identified that considered safety risk factors in outsourcing 
relationships. Of these, 16 reported contracting relationships principally between firms and 
individuals, although some (e.g. Hopkins, 2017; Hakansson and Isidorsson, 2016; Stauss-
Raats, 2019; Underhill and Quinlan, 2011) reported the recruitment of individuals through an 
employment agency. A further 33 reported outsourcing principally between firms. Some of 
the 50 papers combined data from both levels. For example, Mayhew and Quinlan (2006) 
studied outsourcing relationships in the logistics sector in Australia that included both single 
operators (i.e. individuals) and small and large companies (i.e. firms). Sole traders and SMEs 
were also surveyed together in their earlier study of clothing manufacturers (Mayhew and 
Quinlan, 1999). Studies (Glazner et al., 1998; Lowrey et al., 1998) of safety in the 
construction of Denver airport similarly included both individual and firm level data. Papers 
that combined data from across levels were allocated either to the firm-to-individual category 
or to the firm-to-firm category according to the dominant level in the study. McDermott et 
al.’s (2018) study explicitly combined both levels. 
Studies were predominantly from three sectors: construction (n=12), petrochemicals, 
including oil exploration (n=9) and manufacturing (n=7). There were single studies in 
specific sectors, for example in tourism and catering (Belle et al., 2013), space (Garner, 
2006), public transport (Hasle, 2007), airline maintenance (Gregson et al., 2015) and sport 
(McDermott et al., 2018). Several studies using survey instruments collected data from 
multiple sectors (e.g. Fabriano, et al., 2008; Hall, 2016; Hakansson and Isidorsson, 2016; 
Sakurai, et al., 2013; Salminen, et al., 1993).  
Three geographic areas dominated the studies: Europe, including the UK (n=21), N. America 
(n=15), mainly USA, and Australasia (n=11) with 10 studies from Australia. The other three 
were conducted in Brazil (Gomes et al., 2009), Japan (Sakurai et al., 2013) and South Korea 
(Choe et al., 2020). 
 
Alignment of studies to the outsourcing framework 
Interpreting the context of the 50 empirical studies in this review it was possible to locate 43 
of the studies to a particular quadrant of the conceptual framework that describes outsourcing 
arrangements at both the firm-to-firm and firm-to-individual level (Figure 1). Twenty-nine 
studies reported tasks that were core to the client’s business, while 14 studies reported tasks 
that were deemed to be peripheral. Where the reported tasks in these 43 studies could be 
differentiated into either routine or complex tasks, all except one (Garner, 2006) was 
considered to report routine tasks. As a result, the remainder of the paper focuses on the 42 
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papers that report routine tasks, and specifically the differences between routine tasks that 
were core to the client firms business and those that were considered to be peripheral.  
INSERT TABLE 3 NEAR HERE 
Routine-Core tasks (Table 3) 
Firm-to-individual safety risk factors  
Most of the safety risks related to either economic and reward pressures or disorganization 
rather than regulatory failure. Individuals contracted by a client firm to engage in routine 
tasks that are core to the clients business experience insecure jobs and work long and 
irregular hours, which are unsustainable. Belle et al. (2013) report on understaffing in the 
seasonal tourist trade and the expectation that individuals will work the whole season without 
time-off. Similarly, individual are often expected to work at pace. These pressures increase 
stress and the possibility of injuries and accidents. Disorganization in this quadrant is 
characterised by three safety risks (Poor training and supervision, ineffective communication 
and inadequate safety management systems). Training is often considered to be the 
responsibility of the individual rather than the client firm (McDermott, et al., 2018), and so 
may be neglected by the firm. Consequently, competence levels may diminish over time. 
Induction to the site is often minimal and contractors work unsupervised or with less 
supervision than permanent employees (Alamgir et al., 2008; Quinlan et al., 2015). 
Contractors often lack support from full-time workers, meaning that access to advice and 
information is reduced. This can result in a lack of clarity over roles and responsibilities. 
Assessment of risk may also be less. Contractors may also operate alone or in noisy or 
confined spaces. In addition, they also experienced both physical and verbal abuse from 
permanent employees of the firm (Mayhew and Quinlan, 1999; 2006). 
Firm-to-firm safety risk factors 
In outsourcing relationships where firms were offering a routine service to another firm then 
safety risk factors fell into both the economic reward pressures and disorganization 
categories, but rarely regulatory failure.  
Safety risk factors occurring in the routine-core quadrant arise from the nature of the 
contracted task, which differ from those for permanent employees (Blank et al., 1995). These 
tasks are often higher risk and often require execution at pace, increasing work pressure and 
adding stress (Baugher and Roberts, 1999). Unfamiliarity with the site or the changing nature 
of the site (Spangenberg et al., 2002) suggests that accidents are more likely for contractors. 
This is compounded by a lack of induction or limited training (Gregson et al., 2015; Lamare 
et al., 2015). Communication between client firm and contractors is often poor (Manu et al., 
2013) leaving contractors isolated (Lingard et al., 2010) and this is particularly so when there 
is a difference in organizational culture (Drupsteen et al., 2015). Contractual arrangements 
for these tasks especially those that are incentivised financially encourage under-reporting of 
incidents (Collinson, 1999).  
INSERT TABLE 4 NEAR HERE 
Routine-peripheral tasks (Table 4) 
Firm-to-individual safety risk factors 
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Those studies reporting safety risk factors for individuals in the routine-peripheral 
quadrant emphasized economic and reward pressures rather than job disorganization. In 
particular these studies drew attention to job insecurity, accepting short-term contracts both to 
gain and sustain employment (Hall, 2016) and the need to undertake hazardous tasks and 
work long hours (Mehta and Theodore, 2006; Williamson et al., 2009). These individuals 
also experienced pressures to reduce costs and to cut corners (Straus-Raats, 2019; Mayhew et 
al., 1997). Training and the provision of personal protective equipment was also considered 
to be the responsibility of the individual rather than the client organization (Hopkins, 2017). 
Firm-to-firm safety risk factors 
The safety risk factors affecting firm-to-firm outsourcing arrangements in the routine-
peripheral quadrant emphasize disorganization rather than economic and reward pressure. 
Contract workers often have different roles, performing different tasks to permanent 
employees (Rebitzer, 1995) and do not receive organizational safety information (Salminen et 
al., 1993). Sharing information between client and contractor is often poor (Nenonen 2011; 
Schubert and Dijkstra, 2009) so that work instructions may not be clear (Nenonen et al., 
2015). This may be accounted for by differences in organizational safety culture (Nenonen  
and Vasaara, 2013). These differences may result in a lack of clarity over responsibilities, for 
example for providing PPE or training (Nenonen and Vaasara, 2013; Schubert and Dikstra, 
2009). Under reporting of incidents is a characteristic of contracts in this quadrant (Nenonen, 
2011), often because they are short term and require frequent renewal (Kongsvik et al., 2012). 
 
Discussion 
Outsourcing is a common strategy used by organizations in both the private and public 
sectors to focus on their core business. However, the decision to outsource an activity 
immediately and adversely alters the risk profile of the organization; it no longer retains 
control over some aspect of its activity. Understanding the potential business risk precedes 
the subsequent considerations of safety risk from the specific outsourced activity. Belcourt 
(2006) suggest that the decision to outsource is driven by financial savings, strategic focus, 
access to advanced technology, improved service levels, access to specialised expertise and 
organizational politics. Subsequently, Sanders et al. (2007) differentiated these into three 
primary reasons (financial, resource-based and strategic). Financial savings through reduction 
of either employment or production costs may encourage the emphasis on production over 
safety. This approach is often reactive, occurring in response to short-term financial 
indicators. Resource-based considerations seek to compensate for a lack of assets, which may 
be both technical skill and physical infrastructure. Such changes create a dependency on 
others for access to assets. Where these assets are brought on-site effective monitoring 
becomes problematic. Finally, a narrower focus on strategic objectives raises the challenges 
of effective communication and integration, which following outsourcing would span 
organizational boundaries. Outsourcing is driven by a variety of needs, and satisfying any of 
them inevitably introduces risk into the client organization. In addition there are safety risks. 
Underhill and Quinlan (2011) identified three categories of safety risk factors associated with 
outsourcing: Economic and Reward pressure, Disorganization, and Regulatory Failure.  
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Much of the available empirical evidence of the effects of outsourcing on safety risk 
factors reports on routine tasks. There is very little available empirical evidence for the safety 
risk factors associated with complex tasks. Routine tasks are those that typically have a 
common and widely recognised process or procedure that can be provided by many different 
suppliers. In contrast, complex tasks are often specialist and bespoke to the particular 
organisation. It is perhaps more likely that routine tasks will be outsourced and the weight of 
empirical evidence found in this study simply reflects this imbalance. 
Safety risk factors in the studies in this review principally related to economic and 
reward pressure and to disorganization rather than to regulatory failures. These reflect the 
commonly short-term nature of the outsourced task, which attracts under-qualified and 
inexperienced workers, and ineffective communication between the firm and the contractor 
around the nature of the hazards and the clarity of the work practices and procedures that are 
to be adopted. Table 3 indicates that in the outsourcing of routine-core activities similar 
elements of economic and reward pressures and disorganization were found at both firm-to-
firm and firm-to-individual levels. There was no differentiation in the nature of the safety risk 
factors between levels when routine-core tasks were outsourced.  In contrast, the safety risk 
factors occurring in routine-peripheral tasks differ across levels (Table 4). In firm-to-
individual outsourcing arrangements, the safety risk factors are more strongly associated with 
economic and reward pressures, including long work hours and fast paced work and the 
pressure to cut corners and the concern over job security rather than disorganization. 
Conversely, in firm-to-firm outsourcing arrangements safety risk factors are most often 
associated with disorganization rather the economic and reward pressures, and in particular 
ineffective procedures and communication, and short tenure and inexperience.  
Across both types of routine tasks safety risks of outsourcing between firms appear to 
relate more to disorganization, while those associate with firm-to-individual outsourcing 
arrangements emphasize economic and reward pressures. This distinction may relate to the 
likely occurrence of these different relationship types at different points in the supply chain. 
Firm-to-individual outsourcing relationships are typically found at the end of the chain where 
considerations of utilization of resource, time pressures and cost are prominent. Safety risks 
associated with economic and reward pressures may be more evident here because this is the 
point in the supply chain at which they have to be resolved. They cannot be passed on to the 
next organization, because there is none. Conversely, firm-to-firm outsourcing relationships 
may occur throughout the supply chain and client firms can simply transfer their economic 
risks to their contractors and sub-contractors. However, safety risks associated with the 
coordination of these tasks cannot be transferred, so risks associated with disorganization 
remain visible at each link in the chain. 
Of course, the safety risk factors reported in these studies are those that were 
identified. Others may have been present but remained hidden or were overlooked. 
Nevertheless, failure to provide adequate control for any of these identified economic and 
reward or disorganization risks can have a variety of immediate and longer-term 
consequences. Hazardous tasks that are not properly managed can result in injury or ill-health 
for those involved and other employees. Work intensification and long hours cause fatigue. 
This may result in poor concentration and subsequently possible damage either to physical 
assets including equipment and products or to relationships through unsatisfactory service 
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delivery. Disorganization risk factors include inexperience, lack of training and poor 
communication. Each of these may also result in damage to assets or injury to staff. This 
category of risk factors also bears heavy costs in terms of time and resources required to 
rectify resulting problems. Both categories of safety risk factors can lead to reputational 
damage in the longer term, making it more difficult to find firms or individuals to work with. 
When poorly controlled these safety risk factors may also lead to enforcement actions, 
including improvement and prohibition notices, or even prosecutions, which if successful 
result in fines and even custodial sentences, along with adverse publicity. 
This review has three obvious limitations. First, it combines materials from many 
different legal jurisdictions. Identified risks are often a function of legislative requirements, 
which can change over time. Risks identified in different situations (countries and years) may 
vary therefore, with earlier studies perhaps failing to report risk that would obviously be 
reported in more recent studies. While this may impact the detail of this review by 
introducing more risks in newer studies it is unlikely to substantially change the dominant 
conclusions. Second, the studies in this review mainly report simple dyadic relationships 
between client and contractor, and fail to account for more complex configurations of 
contracting relationships, such as those found on multi-party work sites. For an exception, see 
Oswald et al. (2018). These complex collaborations increase safety risks as overall awareness 
of who is performing what task and where diminishes, and as the visibility of the changes to 
the risk profiles of the work becomes more opaque. Third, many of the studies reported here 
were conducted in high-risk environments, including construction and petrochemicals. Many 
people in developed countries work in service organizations, which are typically less 
hazardous and have different risk profiles.  
These limitations suggest opportunities for future research. In addition, the changing 
world of work may also create new and unforeseen safety risks. For example, client 
organizations are now seeking to by-pass Tier 1 contractors and deal directly with Tier 2 
contractors. This introduces risks associated both with capability and competence to manage, 
and with the adequacy of the assurance processes. Safety risk profiles in public sector 
organizations may differ from those on private sector companies, which were the dominant 
form in this review. This warrants investigation. This review also featured hierarchical 
organizations, but organizations with flatter structures or team working are increasingly 
common. How these changes in organizational form influence the safety risk profile is not 
known. Finally, the impact of digitalization, artificial intelligence and the internet of things 




The novel 2x2 framework that differentiates outsourced tasks according to their strategic 
significance to the client firm and their level of complexity permitted the comparison of 
empirical studies of outsourcing across levels. This allowed us to identify and compare the 
safety risk factors that occur in both firm-to-firm and firm-to-individual contracting 
arrangements. There is very little empirical evidence examining the safety risk factors 
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associated with complex tasks. Most of the available evidence relates to the outsourcing of 
routine tasks. Using Underhill and Quinlan’s (2011) PDR-Model, safety risk factors in 
empirical studies of outsourcing may be classified as either economic and reward pressures or 
disorganization rather than regulatory failure. In routine tasks core to the client business 
outsourcing introduces risks associated with both economic and reward pressure and 
disorganization. Whereas in outsourced tasks that are routine and peripheral to the client 
business, safety risks associated with economic and reward pressure are found in firm to 
individual relationships, while safety risk associated with disorganization are found in firm-
to-firm contracts. These differences may reflect the relative positions of firm-to-firm and 
firm-to-individual outsourcing relationships in supply chains.  
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Table 1. Specification of the elements of the PDR model of safety risk factors (developed from Underhill and Quinlan, 2011; Mayhew and 
Quinlan, 1999) 
Economic and Reward Pressures Disorganization Regulatory Failure 
A. Insecure Jobs  
 Working when injured 
 Accepting hazardous tasks 
 Off-loading high-risk activities 
 
B. Contingent, irregular payment 
 Income insecurity 
 Task work / payment by results 
 Competition / underbidding of 
tenders 
 Cutting corners 
 
C. Long or irregular work hours  
 Long hours 
 Pace 
 Work intensification 
 Lack of resource 
 
D. Multiple jobholding 
 
  
A. Short tenure, inexperience  
 Underqualified, under trained, 
inexperienced workers 
 
B. Poor induction, training and supervision  
 More complicated lines of management 
control 
 
C. Ineffective procedures and 
communication 
 Intergroup / inter-worker communication 
 Ambiguity in rules, work practices and 
procedures 
 
D. Ineffective OHSMS / inability to organize 
 Splintering of OHS management system 
 Inability of outsourced workers to organize 




A. Poor knowledge of legal rights, 
obligations 
 
B. Limited access to OHS, workers’ 
compensation rights 
 
C. Fractured or disputed legal 
obligations 
 Multi-party sites 
 
D. Non-compliance and regulatory 
oversight 















Number of relevant 
results (based on 




Number of relevant 





Quinlan et al. (2001) 22 22 22 13  12 
Quinlan and Bohle 
(2008) 
24 24 10 6  5 
Milch and Laumann 
(2016) 
19 19 13 4  4 

























26 23 9 1  
      






Table 3. Safety risks associated with routine-core tasks in both firm-to-individual and firm-to-firm outsourcing relationships. See Table 1 for 
details of category labels. 
Author Location of study Sector Economic and Reward 
Pressure 
Disorganisation 
   A B C D A B C D 
Firm-to-individual           
Alamgir et al Canada Healthcare      X   
Belle et al Italy Catering/Tourism X  X   X   
Mayhew and Quinlan (1997) Australia / UK Construction  X X    X X 
Mayhew and Quinlan (1999) Australia Clothing manufacture X  X  X    
Mayhew and Quinlan (2006) Australia Logistics X  X     X 
McDermott et al Australia Athletics   X      
Quinlan et al Australia Healthcare   X   X X X 
Firm-to-firm           
Baugher and Timmons Roberts USA Petrochemicals X  X  X    
Blank et al Sweden Mining       X X 
Choe et al South Korea Construction        X 
Collinson UK Oil  X X      
Drupsteen et al The Netherlands Logistics       X X 
Glazner et al (1998) USA Construction      X X  
Glazner et al (1999) USA Construction       X  
Gregson et al Australia Airline maintenance X  X  X X   
Hasle Denmark Public transport    X  X   X 
Hery et al France Petrochemicals         
Kochan et al USA Petrochemicals      X   
Lamare et al New Zealand Coal mining     X X  X 
Lingard et al Australia Construction X  X    X  
Lowery et al USA Construction     X X X  
Manu et al UK Construction     X  X X 
McDermott et al Australia Construction   X      
22 
 
Milch and Laumann Norway Petrochemicals      X X X 
Oswald et al UK Construction  X    X X X 
Rebitzer USA Petrochemicals     X X   
Shrestha et al USA Construction   X      





Table 4. Safety risks associated with routine-peripheral tasks in both firm-to-individual and firm-to-firm outsourcing relationships. See Table 1 
for details of category labels. 
Author Location of 
study 
Sector Economic and 
Reward Pressure 
Disorganisation 
   A B C D A B C D 
Firm-to-individual           
Hall Canada Multiple (incl. healthcare, manufacturing, 
logistics, construction, food) 
X    X X   
Hopkins UK Food manufacturing   X  X    
Mayhew et al. Australia Childcare, hospitality, logistics and construction  X X      
Mehta and Theodore USA Construction X  X   X   
Strauss-Raats Sweden / Poland Manufacturing X X   X    
Williamson et al. Australia Logistics  X X      
Firm-to-firm           
Kongsvik et al. Norway Offshore service vessels in support of 
petroleum companies 
  X      
Nenonen Finland Manufacturing      X X X 
Nenonen and Vasara Finland Manufacturing - with multiple employers on 
site 
    X  X  
Nenonen et al. Finland Manufacturing     X X X  
O’Brien USA Manufacturing      X X X 
Rebitzer USA Petrochemicals     X X   
Salminen et al Finland Multiple (including construction and 
manufacturing) 
    X  X  
Schubert and Dijkstra The Netherlands Process industries (Agro, Gas and Chemicals)   X  X  X  









Figure 1. Conceptual framework for differentiating outsourcing arrangements  
 
